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IJA Occupation Policy
The Occupation Policy of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second World
War is the saga of failed military objectives contrasted with an ultimately
successful political program. In an ideal policy these two objectives
would work hand in glove. The reality was that these two objectives often
worked at cross purposes.
The reasons for the failure of the Japanese to achieve their military
objectives rest primarily in their misreading of Allied reactions to Japanese
aggression and in their unprepared ness to deal with the fruits of their
aggression.
Japan came late to the colonial when compared to the western powers she
came to blows with. In practical terms this meant that Japan had neither
the experience nor the needed apparatuses to administer colonies. This
inexperience in colonial administration is significant because after the
first six months of the Japanese offensive she had added over a million
square miles of land, 150,000,000 new subjects, and 150,000 western prisoners
of war. The totals were staggering, 300,000,000 subjects in China alone
and a further 140,000,000 in South East Asia.
These acquisitions presented significant challenges even though Japan
had formed the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEAC-PS) as early
as late summer 1940. And it is with this GEAC-PS that the split in objectives
occurred. Tojo stated that the official reasons for the initiating of
the conflict. “The objective in the Greater East Asia War is founded
on the exalted ideals of the founding of the Empire and it will enable
all nations and peoples of Greater East Asia to enjoy life and to establish
a new order of coexistence and co-prosperity on the basis of justice with
Japan as the nucleus”
While these noble sounding aspirations did represent the official political
goals they did not fully represent the military goals undertaken to buttress
these political goals. From a military perspective the war was about securing
a free flow of raw economic material resources. Which when coupled with
an aggressive and successful military operation would force the Allied
powers to the table for a negotiated settlement.
This is an important idea to grasp. Japan’s plan mandated and relied
on a negotiated settlement rather than the protracted struggle for conquest
which in fact occurred. As the hoped for settlement began to fade in blood
and fire the Japanese began to switch from her avowed political goals
and hastened to extract resources to meet the realized long term fight
for survival. This meant in practical terms that Japan was forced to adopt
the roll and methods of the colonial powers she had just ousted.
The Japanese, though hopeful in the beginning for a settlement, were at
the same time realists about their situation. This realism actually led
to her initiating the hostilities which occurred. As a result of the US
lead embargo over Japan’s China policies she had only about six
months reserves of petroleum and other vital war material on hand. The
Japanese felt that to be capable of finishing the war in China she needed
the resumption of trade in raw materials. Japan choose to strike now and
negotiate from a position of strength while she still had it rather than
a position of ever increasing weakness. Given the vastness of Japan’s
rapidly expanded empire in the pacific region an even more critical shortage
was in the realm of merchant shipping. Japan’s military planners
estimated that they would need 13,000,000 tons of shipping to maintain
both the homeland and their military machine. Yet, at the start of hostilities
Japan only had 7,000,000 tons of merchant shipping available and as the
war progressed, the Allies were sinking the merchant fleet faster then
Japan could replace the losses.
So it is evident that the seeds of Japanese military failure were present
from the very beginning in their misreading of Allied reactions.
This quick overview leads us into the actual methods and applications
of Japanese policy in regards to its occupation of new lands and peoples.
The first general statement to be remembered is that there was no practical
uniform approach. Policies varied from colony to colony depending upon
who was in charge, what resources were available, what level of resistance
was offered to Japanese occupation and whether you were a native or a
westerner.
Since the Japanese lacked adequate, in terms of training and numbers,
colonial administrators and that they did not even form a colonial administration
bureau until November of 1942, it was decided in November of 1941 to let
the local military field commanders exercise control until an effective
administration could be set up. One of the effects of this policy of letting
local military field commanders have absolute control was unevenness in
administration. There was also a standing Japanese military tradition
of non-interference in local affairs by higher authorities. So the effectiveness
of the administration and the treatment of the locals were fully dependent
on the character and whims of the local commander as opposed to official
government policies.
The notable exception to this was in Siam. Siam had declared itself a
full partner and ally of the Japanese and so were rewarded with a regime
of politeness. In general one can say that local Japanese commanders found
as a whole brutality to be much easier then understanding which went a
long way towards souring the initial wide spread enthusiasm of the Japanese
pronouncements of Pan-Asianism. The locals were therefore answerable ultimately
to the Japanese military which because they spoke for the Emperor were
answerable to no one. It was entirely a closed moral loop. This closed
morality loop would have dire effects for allied POWs which we will discuss
more in detail later.
When looking at Japan’s occupation policies one is struck by a double
standard. This double standard was in the way the Japanese treated the
Chinese as opposed to the rest of their Asian subjects. Japan had been
embroiled in China for almost a decade by the time she initiated wider
hostilities. And in China the policy used was based on the principal of
collective responsibility. As things and events became more serious elsewhere
this policy would eventually be applied in varying degrees elsewhere as
well. Though Japan had tried to inject a statement in the charter of the
League of Nations against racism she did exhibit a policy of racial bias
against the Chinese. This manifested itself in 1942 in the “Three
All Campaign” (Loot All! Burn All! Kill All!). This “Three
All Campaign” was aimed primarily against the Chinese Communists
though it did spill over into other areas as well. The intent of the campaign
was to free up targeted areas for the extraction of natural resources
with any form of hindrance.
Because of Japans long embroilment in China there developed a great degree
of frustration amongst the troops because of constant casualties for little
gain. There developed amid the troops in China severe disciplinary problems
including rampant drunkenness and overt acts of brutality as early as
1939. Western observers commented that the excessive brutality seemed
to be the Japanese soldiers way of taking vengeance in advance of their
own impending death.
As most Japanese soldiers used in the Southern offensives had some degree
of experience in China these had feelings vis-à-vis the Chinese
remained in their hearts and manifested themselves against those ethnic
Chinese the encountered out side of China.
It was common knowledge amongst the Japanese that those Chinese outside
of china had eagerly supported their homeland in its struggle against
Japan. This would cost those ethnic Chinese in Singapore dearly. In mid
February, 1942 over 5,000 native Chinese were killed outright by the Japanese
occupation forces merely on the suspicion that the Chinese harbored “anti-Japanese
attitudes.”
The Chinese in Singapore were not the only ones to feel the wrath of Japanese
frustration in the early stages of the conflict. In Dutch Borneo the Japanese
found that the vital oil wells had been set ablaze. Their inevitable retort
was to kill al of the Europeans in the area. In Tjepu, Java the Japanese
also lashed out, killing all Caucasian males and mistreating the women.
Surprisingly despite a Japanese policy of decolonization which included
the destruction of all vestiges and monuments of the former colonial powers
the fate of most captured European civilians was not so harsh. In general
they were rounded up, interned in make shift camps and then left to fend
for themselves.
Natives were split in their views of the Japanese humiliation of their
former colonial overlords. Most tended to be elated, caught up in the
Japanese propaganda of Asia for Asians. Others, most notably in the Philippines,
where there was an on going resistance movement against (upwards of 350,000
Filipinos were involved) the Japanese forces were outraged. Many of these
natives would risk their own and their neighbors lives to help out their
former overlords.
The plight of the natives how ever worsened as the military situation
began to turn against Japan. Many had in the beginning, great hopes believing
that prosperity and better times were just around the corner. As the situation
worsened some were apt to joke that the Cp-Prosperity Sphere had become
the Co-Poverty Sphere. I n their zeal to establish an Asia for Asians
the Japanese sought a total overhaul of local governments building to
the establishment of friendly native administrations. Their methods of
accomplishing this were wide in scope and often counter productive.
The Japanese banned all political parties, public assembly and were notoriously
harsh towards those who spread “fabulous wild rumors”. They
also gagged the local press, mandated that only Japanese radio programs
be listened to, and banned western music, movies and the speaking of western
languages. Local schools were immediately closed until a new Japanese
approved curriculum could be taught. This curriculum taught history from
an Asian point view, forced students to learn Japanese and mandated that
all dates be kept by the Japanese calendar system.
Besides these methods the Japanese predictably instituted Identity papers
and check points. They also made people wear arm bands which denoted the
level of trustworthiness of the wearer in the eyes of the Japanese. Which
of course the natives could never judge because they were ordered to bow
in respect before the presence of any Japanese. The Japanese merged all
banks into the Southern Regions Development Bank. This lead to a devaluation
of currency and in turn a 50% decrease in real wages when compared to
pre-war standards under the colonial powers. The economy was further hamstrung
by Japanese industrial concerns annexing all lucrative businesses which
in the end did very little to help the war effort. As a result natives
began to complain about the lack of available food stuffs and consumer
goods. The Japanese tried to divert responsibility on to the west for
breaking off trade relations with the colonies.
The natives situation was further exacerbated by the Japanese invasion
logistics policy of having troops live off of the land. This decimated
many localities, stripping them of food stuffs and other goods. Many of
these localities would not recover to pre-war levels. This situation was
made direr by the Japanese use of locals for forced labor. Upwards of
at least 100,000 men were taken for labor and as many as 10,000 women
were put into Japanese military brothels as comfort women.
Over all the ad-hoc nature and uneven handling of the natives and the
resources failed to render the promised economic gains that the Japanese
planners had envisioned. From a military industrial point of view the
policies failed to support at adequate levels the Japanese war effort.
This desire for the extraction and use of natural resources for the war
effort played out against the political backdrop of the GEAC-PS which
ultimately, after the war, did in fact prove successful, though to late
to be of any assistance to the Japanese Empire.
The lynch pin of this political maneuvering was the GEAC-PS which was
formed by the Japanese in mid 1940. It was however, not until November,
1943, that there was held the Tokyo Conference of the GEAC-PS. As a prelude
to this conference Burma declared independence on the first of August,
1943, causing the Japanese administrator GEN Masakazu Kawabe to order
the withdrawal of Japanese military administration. In exchange Burma
dutifully declared war on both the United States of America and the United
Kingdom. Burma was not alone, the Philippines declared independence on
the 14th of October and a week later on the 21st of October, 1943 a provisional
government of Free India was declared.
The November Fifth conference was chaired by Tojo who proclaimed “
… a new order of common prosperity and well being”. Under
Tojo’s chairmanship were delegations from China, Japan, Siam, Manchuko,
The Philippines, and Burma. Indonesia was not granted a seat at the table
as the Japanese felt that the Indonesians were not capable yet of handling
all of the vast natural resources they had.
In his diaries Tojo noted that this was the happiest time of his life.
Tojo was at heart an ardent Pan-Asianist. This obvious enthusiasm Tojo
projected for Pan-Asianism caused great concern to members of the Imperial
Japanese Army who felt that Tojo would sell them out in favor of his Pan-Asiatic
leanings.
The conference was filled with high sounding and impassioned rhetoric
and in the end by unanimous vote issued a proclamation which called for
an order of common prosperity and well being based on justice, respect
for each others independence, sovereignty and traditions, efforts to accelerate
economic development on the basis of reciprocity and an end to all racial
discrimination.
Previous to the declaration Japan had admitted that at times its occupation
policies were oppressive and arbitrary though never racially biased.
Treatment of POW’s
This arbitrary nature of conduct was very much in evidence along with
varying degrees of racism in the Japanese treatment of Allied POWs. All
total the Japanese administered some 676 POW Camps. 176 in the home islands
and 500 in occupied lands. The majority of these camps were located near
native villages. This was done as a psychological warfare tool in order
to win the hearts and minds of the natives. The Japanese wanted to degrade
the formally all powerful Westerners in the eyes of their former subjects.
This was done by degrading prisoner parades and simply by showing Asians
(the Japanese) constantly in positions of power over the westerners. These
camps held 150,000 White Allied POWs. The Japanese additionally captured
and interred as POWs 180,000 Asian troops. These Asian troops were mostly
Pilipinos fighting with the Americans and Indians in service to the English
crown. The vast majority of all POW’s captured by Japan were taken
in the first six months of fighting. Though some camps were harsh and
other were notably lax fully 27% of all Allied POWs in Japanese captivity
died there.
Perhaps a Japanese Engineer Regimental Commander said it best “It
is necessary that subordinates be trained so that in the future they will
be capable of dominating white-men and putting them to work”
Underlying all of this was the Japanese attitude towards the Geneva accords
of 1929. the accords and their regulations were never a part of Japanese
military instruction. The Japanese did sign the Accords but as they repeatedly
pointed out, they were never ratified by the Diet. In response to Allied
inquiries about adherence to the Accords the Japanese foreign Minister,
Shigenari Togo, stated that Japan would adhere to the Accords “though
with necessary changes. One of the changes that Tojo indicated in 1942
after the Doolittle raid was that henceforth captured Allied airmen would
not be treated as POW’s but rather as war criminals and automatically
subject to the death penalty.
These “necessary changes” were further worsened by Japanese
attitudes towards POWs. This attitude towards POWs also carried over towards
their attitudes about handling and guarding POWs. To the Japanese this
type of work was almost as dishonorable as being a POW. As a result of
these cultural conditioning only drunkards, criminals, and other misfits
were assigned to these duties. In addition the Japanese recruited thousands
of Koreans to act as camp guards. The Japanese treated the Koreans meanly
and the Koreans in turn wreaked there revenge for their treatment on the
Allied POW’s.
This sense of dishonor was coupled to a system with no external moral
authority. The relationship of law, society, and religion was focused
inexorably on the person of the Emperor-God. He was the embodiment and
apex of belief and authority both in the here and now and in eternity.
Therefore at the individual level when an officer spoke, and he spoke
in the name of the Emperor this was the pinnacle of moral authority itself.
In effect the soldier operated in a closed moral loop with no external
checks or balances except for the command of the Emperor himself.
The case against the Japanese was made in the War Crime Trials known as
The International Military Tribunals for the Far East. In the end though
many Japanese in the lower echelons would receive an amnesty the wheels
of justice allowed for some 920 executions of former Japanese soldiers.
This worked out as a ratio of one Japanese executed for every 250 Allied
POW murdered by the Japanese.
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