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The Bear Swallows the Eagle:
The Failure of Soviet/Polish Diplomacy and the Fate of the Warsaw Uprising

By Christopher A. Harris, oi_katacpofa on 1JMA.

Geographically squeezed between the increasingly aggressive Nazi Germany and the quietly militarizing Soviet Russia, Poland was fated to serve as the buffer zone between larger states. To assure the safety of the militarily inferior Polish nation, its government set upon a path of aggressive diplomacy to compensate for the unfortunate geo-political position and smaller size. Starting in 1932, Poland came to terms with the Soviet Government with the Pact of Non-aggression between Poland and the USSR, which stated in clear language: "The two contracting parties…reciprocally undertake to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other party…" (1) With the Soviet border settled, Poland and Germany began talks of establishing peaceful relations. Adolph Hitler's Nazi Government in January of 1934 agreed to the German Polish Agreement, which laid out terms for the mutual settlement of grievances:" In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes." (2)

Having placed Poland between the great powers under the umbrella of non-aggression pacts, Polish diplomacy reached its highest point. As history would show the next six years would lead toward the double betrayal of Poland by both Germany and the Soviet Union and the destruction of Poland as a nation. Once again, Poland's location would put it in a unique position after the June 22nd German attack on the Soviet Union. The Polish Government in exile or London Poles, headed by General Sikorski, found itself in an unlikely alliance with the Soviet Union, which only a year and a half prior had joined with the Nazi's in the invasion of Poland. With 1941 came the "creation of a Polish Army in Russia, under the sovereignty of Poland but under the operational control of the Soviet High command…to total 181,000 men" . (3)" . Resumption of diplomatic activity ensued with the USSR recognizing "…that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity" (4) and that "the two governments [Poland and the USSR] mutually undertake to render one another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany." (5) With these first steps toward agreement between the Soviet government and the London Poles, a relationship of mutual understanding and similar goals fostered hopes of a quick end to the war against Germany.


However encouraging the initial resurgence of Polish/Soviet diplomacy may have seemed some outstanding issues still plagued the great powers. The issue of post-war borders plagued the relations, as the Poles refused to negotiate on the matter of returning to the pre-1939 borders, while the Soviets preferred the post '39 borders, also known as the Kuzon line. This issue remained a back-burner issue, at least until the true test of Polish/Soviet diplomacy, this being the German discovery of the Katyn forest graves of nearly 10,000 Polish officers. "The issue simmered quietly until the Germany discovered the graves of nearly 10000 Polish offices in the Katyn Forest. On April 13th the Berlin Broadcasting Station:

It is reported from Smolensk that the local population has indicated to the German authorities a place in which the Bolsheviks has perpetrated secretly mass executions and where the GPU had murdered 10,000 Polish Officers (6)

This discovery would prove to both be the catalyst for the breaking of ties between the London Poles and the Soviets and the end of the London Poles as an effective governmental body. To ensure that the London Poles were relevant in post-war Europe, it would have been crucial that they maintain proper diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, or somehow seize control of the nation before the Soviets could influence the newly liberated Polish nation. However, the possibility of an uprising could only have succeeded under the most perfect of circumstances and diplomatic conditions, and this is where the London poles chose to gamble the future of Poland. After Katyn, in order to resume proper diplomatic relations, the London Poles myopically chose to force the Soviets to accept the pre-1939 borders. The Soviets failed to cooperate, and in maintaining this inflexibility towards post-war borders, the Londynskie Bieguny risked not only the existence of a free and democratic Poland, but also sealed the fate of the Armia Krajowa and the Warsaw Insurrection.The Soviet Union would immediately and defiantly renounce the German charges of murder. Within two days of the German broadcast the Soviet authorities proclaimed:

These arrant German-Fascist murders, whose hands are stained with the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent victims, who methodically exterminate the populations of countries they have occupied without sparing children, women, or old people, who exterminated many hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens in Poland itself, will deceive no one by their base lies and slander. (7)

With the evidence less than clear about who was the guilty party was in the Katyn Massacre, the Poles chose to "fall" for the German deception, and confronted the Soviet leaders on the subject. Early analysis of the evidence by Waverly Root concluded, "neither side is more credible than the other" (8) and the general opinion of the allies was that "the Poles had fallen into a Nazi Trap" and that this deception had given the Russians "the perfect opportunity for breaking relations" . (9) The London Poles held enough suspicion of the Soviets, and gave just enough regard to German claims to pressure the Germans by requesting "detailed and precise information as to the fate of the Prisoners of war and civilians previously detained in the camps of Kozielsk, Starovielsk and Ostashkov". (10) The pressures of the London Poles and the already resentful attitudes of the Soviet officials toward the London Poles created the ideal atmosphere for a failure of diplomatic relations. On April 25, 1943 the Soviet Government announced:

The present Government of Poland…has adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. On the strength of the above, the Soviet Government has decided to sever relations with the Polish Government . (11)

With this, the final crucial stage was set for a frantic year of diplomacy. Nevertheless, one final barrier stood between the Soviet Government and the complete irrelevancy of the London Poles, and that was the British Commitment to Poland, specifically the government in exile in London. When pressed by the Soviets in regards toward the creation of a new polish government, the British emphasized that "We should not…be able to recognize such a government and would continue our relations with Sikorski (12) The advancing red-army was approaching Polish territory; diplomatic ties were cut, and the chances for a reasonable outcome for the London Poles was faint.

With these factors in mind, it can be presumed that the Government in Exile might consider negotiation, especially with the democratic future of Poland, and their own role in it, on the line. As is recorded in the diplomatic papers of Poland, Britain, and the Soviet Union, this willingness to bargain effectively doomed the already weakened London Poles and the Warsaw uprising with it.

The British Government entered World War Two largely on behalf of the Poles, thus they held considerable interest in the post-war condition of Poland. Their wartime role as mediator between the Poles and Soviets greatly increased after the severing of diplomatic relations between the Soviets, Poles, and Britain fought very hard to reconcile the fractious parties, ensuring both the reestablishment of Polish Democracy, and a content Soviet Ally which would bear the brunt of the fight against the Nazis. This decision created a zero-sum game in which appeasing one side only further alienated the other, and only one would win. Stepping into the midst of this, the British government proposed a settlement to the London Poles offering large swaths of eastern Germany and Prussia asking: "Would you consider such a solution acceptable?" (13) This came as a subtle push for the Poles to open up toward a more flexible post-war border conclusion. The Poles claiming, "that no Polish Government abroad would be able to discuss the question of Polish Territory", refuted this (14) Two months later, Secretary Hull implied that because the "Allies had no armed forces in Central Europe…it was unlikely that the Soviets would change their position without some compromise on the territorial issue". (15)


Poland made the rightful assertion that they see no reason that "Poland should make any further sacrifices, either in territory or in population, in addition to those which she has already made and is still making in the…unflinching defense of her own freedom" (16) and most critically laying out in clear terms to the Soviet Government that "The Polish government stands firm for the integrity of Polish territory." (17) Poland was steering a course away from where the United States and Great Britain wanted them to go, which now seems highly out of accordance for a power as weakened as the London Poles were to so steadfastly hold onto the idea maintaining the pre-war Polish borders. However in the right the Poles may have been, they were engaging in a very high stakes game of diplomacy with a very shrewd and powerful opponent. The Soviet Union saw this irrational behavior of the London Poles and used it to their advantage. Seeing that the United States and Britain were pushing for compromise, they Soviet Government pointed out "It is well known that the Polish Government took a position completely at variance with such relations" of the solutions presented by both the United States and Great Britain. (18)

The Curzon territories were seen by the Allies as a small price to pay for the chance to ensure a free and democratic Poland. Would this have been enough to appease Stalin and the Soviet Union?
Here lays the great question facing the allied leaders and the London Poles. Giving up Curzon might have looked good on paper, but if Soviet tanks remained in Warsaw after the war ended and a new government formed outside London, these diplomatic appeasements would be meaningless. (19) The Poles were aware of this threat of destruction and the back channel plotting between the Allied powers and the Soviet Union. They knew that the Soviets had much to gain by emphasizing the split between the Poles and Russia, and to compensate for this; the Poles began final preparations for seizing power in Poland.A planned uprising of the resistance forces in Poland would occur regardless of the geopolitical situation in Poland.

Whether the forces of Armia Krajowa were welcoming the advancing Red Army or resisting them, plans were in motion before the Katyn debacle for an anti-German insurrection. The sudden deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union radically shifted the goal of the rising Poles: now they were not only forcing out the German forces, they were intervening before the Soviets could place their own government into power. Unfortunately the fate of any Polish insurrection depended "upon the extent of equipment and reinforcement supplied from abroad". (20) This critical weakness was to prove vital fatal? in the actual uprising, as a dependency the Red Army became more apparent , (21) just as the uprising was designed to prevent direct occupation by the Red Army. Regardless of this humbling realization of foreign dependency, the London Poles had to decide what to do with the underground fighters as the Soviet troops entered Poland; "…namely, whether we should order the underground authorities at home to step forward and take over administration of the country, or…to remain in hiding in view of the threat of repression" . (22) Diplomacy between the Poles and British on October 5th 1943 would also increase the tensions, as the British made the less than subtle point that "Do you think you will be able to get those valuable acquisitions and at the same time keep your eastern frontiers? That is not possible." (23) ." The Soviets presented on January 11th of 1944 a clear answer to this incarnation of the Polish Question proclaiming "…through the restoration to Poland of lands which belonged to her from time immemorial and which were wrested from Poland by the Germans". (24) This border was to be ethnically secured with the "so-called Curzon line which was adopted in 1919 by the Supreme Council of Allied Powers and which provides for the inclusion of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in the Soviet Union". (25)

Following the British plan, the Soviets confirm "Poland's western borders must be extended through the incorporation in Poland of ancient Polish land previously wrested by Germany and without which it is impossible to unite the whole Polish people" .(26) Soon afterwards, a meeting of British and Polish officials discussed this reply. The British representatives realized that "…the Polish government would be making a great mistake should they reject the Soviet Proposal" (27) and the highly cynical view that "Should Poland refuse, any possibility of a Polish -Soviet Understanding before the end of war would be ruled out".(28) For Poland to remain "free" without concessions, they would require extensive intervention on the part of the allies. Ideas of British seizure of Prussian ports, paradropping of the Polish Airborne division, or even the hope of the D-Day invasion leading toward the meeting of Allied and Soviet forces in Poland all offered hope for the continued democratization of Poland. However, without an Allied willingness to make these steps and the clear statement from the Americans and British that "It was unthinkable that this country [England] should go to war with the Soviet Union over the Polish Eastern Frontier…". (29)

There are two sides to the border question and although the Poles stood on a moral high ground, as the British pointed out, the Soviets held some rights in the creation of the post-war order. Losing twenty million men and bearing the brunt of the military defeat of the Nazis gave the Soviets the right in the eyes of the British to request some territories as reward. (30) To fail to reach a settlement would allow Poland to be "…exposed to Russian Wrath…". (31) With these exchanges during January of 1944, Polish officials came to the realization that the US/UK alliance was only willing to back the London Poles efforts at democracy with an agreement to give up the Curzon territories. Still, they defiantly stood by their stance that "Poland must not come out of this war diminished or wronged". (32) Geo-politically, this was a suicidal act by the Poles. The Soviet Armies were advancing across the European steppe, by February they were on the Byelorussian borders and rapidly closing on the Polish homeland (33) If an agreement were to take place that would offer the slightest chance of a democratic Poland, it would have to occur with the next few months or the London Poles would lose all power. Already the Soviets were working with an alternative Polish government, despite British threats that doing so would "…raise an issue" between the allies. (34) Stalin had legitimate grievances with the London Poles, citing the remarks made by Polish ambassadors abroad and the tone of underground publications within Poland itself as being hostile to the Soviet Union. (35) At this point, tensions were extraordinarily high as the British and Soviets both knew that time was short, and both were fighting continued statements by the London Poles that "The Polish Government are unable to accept the demand pressed by the USSR that they should agree to the Curzon line as the future Polish-Soviet boundary" (36) The resolute nature of Polish Diplomacy is a proud symbol of the steadfast nature of the Polish people, however given the circumstances, a willingness to negotiate may have saved the Poles from Soviet hegemony.

The final phase of Soviet-Polish diplomacy would be the climatic end of the London Poles as a political entity, the destruction of the Armia Krajowa in the Warsaw Uprising, and the last chance for democracy in Poland. On March 9th, the BBC broadcasted statements advocating the cession of Poland's eastern territories. This would subsequently infuriate the Poles, calling out accusation that "..the Curzon line could be not regarded by the Polish Nation except in the same way as Czechoslovakia had regarded the Munich agreement". (37) The Poles would draw upon the example of Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler and the current situation to emphasize the lack of real Guarantee Poland held against Soviet oppression. The British would try one last time to push the decision on post war borders to after the armistice with as many veiled threats as the situation allowed (38) but it would only serve to infuriate the Soviets and push them to their possibly inevitable decision to break ties with the London Poles completely. Stalin wrote that he felt that "The Soviet Union is in conflict with the Polish émigré Government which does not represent the interests of the Polish people or its aspirations". (39)

From this point, at least from the Soviet perspective, the London Poles were dead as an institution. Worse yet, they could be considered a hostile element to the advancing Soviet armies and slowly the death of the Warsaw Uprising came to pass. Another month of futile diplomatic arguments would follow, until Churchill gave up, announcing:, "Our effort to bring about a renewal of relations between the Polish Government and Russia in London has not succeeded." . (40) The Soviet Union's offer to leave Poland unmolested in exchange for the Curzon territories was flatly rejected by the Poles on multiple occasions despite the best efforts of the British and American diplomats. This refusal rendered the London Poles ineffectual, and also created the impression that the Armia Krajowa was an opponent to the Red Army.

The uprising from this point was no longer a means of seizing the capital before the Germans could destroy it. Now it was a last ditch effort to maintain a democratic Poland headed by the government in exile. Polish diplomacy focused for the remainder of the pre-uprising period focus on preparing the nation for the impending approach of Soviet troops and the Uprising itself. On June 22nd the Soviets would embark on Operation Bagration, one of the most spectacular offensive of the Second World War. In only a few short weeks, the Soviet armies advanced 350 km, almost to the Gates of Warsaw. Polish plans for a rising went into high gear, however the high command was aware of the unique circumstances required for success and the tedious relationship the underground must hold with the Soviets. The advancing army was to be seen as "mighty comrades-in-arms in the fight against Germany" and "Dangerous Conquerors threatening our…independence". (41) Political resistance was to be the key to success, and should a chance arise, Armia Krajowa occupation of major cities was to be accomplished. (42) With Rokossovsky's First Byelorussian Front reaching the suburbs of Warsaw, just across the Vistula River, the time appeared right for a Rising. The forces of Armia Krajowa would rise and fight the German in Savage Street fighting, expecting the allies to support them in seizing their capital. Help was extended; both by Allied airdrops and including the occasional Soviet help, however the swift attack on the city by Soviet forces never materialized, and the third betrayal of the Poles ensued.

Why didn't the Soviet forces move into Warsaw sooner? Militarily, Rokossovsky's forces were on their last legs after the huge Soviet advance. Supplies had to be brought up en masse to keep the army on the advance and increasing German counterattacks by the 9th army on the northern side of the city also interfered. (43) Politically, the Uprising was doomed by the failure of any agreement between the London Poles and the Soviet leaders. There was nothing to be gained by Soviet assistance to Warsaw, as it was an uprising launched by the military arm of the government in exile, and to assist was to grant legitimacy to a government already pronounced defunct by Soviet leaders. Had the Poles included more of the communist supporting Armia Ludowja, a better case could be argued for a beneficial Soviet support, however this was not the case. The Warsaw Uprising was launched to prevent the rise of Soviet control over Poland, thus it makes little sense to rely on Soviet support for the insurrection. The inability of the London Poles to come to terms with the Soviets crippled their legitimacy and in effect doomed the efforts to ensure a democratic Poland. Against the advice of America and the British the Poles chose to gamble their democratic future on the strength of their moral stance, assuming that by merely standing for the pre war borders, they could hold up against the Soviet onslaught. The Warsaw uprising was the absolute last chance for the London Poles to exercise any real impact on the future of Poland as a democratic nation. The path of diplomacy taken by the Poles effectively doomed this uprising long before the first shots and the blame placed on the Soviets for not assisting this rising are sketchy in their weight. Why would the advancing Red Army and the Soviet Government wish to assist a force rising to prevent their entrance into Warsaw? It makes little sense in the Realpolitik viewpoint for a nation to support a rising designed to go against their nation. Had the London Poles shown a willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union in regards to post-war Poland, a chance remained that Poland could of remained democratic. The idea that Stalin would of have left Poland as a free nation is highly debatable as he was a tyrant and held the military control over Poland, thus he faced little opposition in what was done with the post-war situation. It seems reasonable however for the weaker London Poles to try and negotiate with the Soviets, even if it was futile, their actions only sped up the disembowelment of their government and doomed the lives of several hundred thousand Poles during the Warsaw Uprising.



Notes:

 

1) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 p15

2) Text of German-Polish agreement of January 26, 1934". British War Blue Book

3) Fleming, D.F. The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960 p222

4) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 Polish Soviet agreement annulling the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relating to Poland… p 141
ibid

5) ibid

6) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 Communiqué issued by Berlin Broadcasting station on the discovery of Graves of Polish Officers in the Smolensk area p523

7) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 Communique issued by the Soviet Information Bureau attacking the German Propaganda in connection with the murder of Polish officers in the Smolensk area p524

8) Fleming, D.F. The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960p229-I would like to emphasize that for this paper I assumed as did many that the definite aggressor of the Katyn crime was unknown. It is obviously now well accepted that the Soviet authorities authorized this heinous crime, and bear the full weight of the guilt

9) ibid p 229

10) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 note from Minister Raczynski to Ambassador Bogomolov demanding an explanation of the fate of Polish Prisoners missing in the USSR p524

11) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 Note from Commissar Molotov to Ambassador Romer concerning the severance of relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government p 533

12) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943 Telegram from Mr. Churchill to M. Stalin appealing for the resumption of relations… p 539

13)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Count Raczynski's report on a meeting attended by M. Mikolajczyk, Dr. Retinger… p 49

14) ibid

15) Fleming, D.F. The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960p231

16)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Speech delivered by M. Romer at the meeting of the National Council defining the Policy of the Polish Government with regard to the USSR p52

17) ibid

18) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Aide-Memoire of the People's commissariat for Foreign Affairs… p 57

19) Fleming, D.F. The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960 p235, Zawodny, J.K. Nothing but Honour, The story of the Warsaw Uprising, 1944. , Chiechanowski, Jan M. The Warsaw Uprising. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

20) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Statement referring to the Polish Armed Forces abroad and their secret military organization in Poland…p 53

21) Polish Plans would begin to presume a rapid Soviet entrance into Warsaw as an important prerequisite for a successful uprising.

22) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945Demands made by the Polish Government in connection with… p 61

23) ibid

24)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the question of the Polish-Soviet Frontier p 133

25)ibid

26)ibid

27)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945INote on a conversation between M, Mikolajcyk, M. Romer, Count Racznynski, Mr. Eden… p 135

28) ibid

29)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Agreed record of a conversation between M. Mikolajczyk, M. Romer, Count Raczynski, Mr. Churchill… p 144

30) ibid p 146

31) ibid p 147

32)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Dispatch from M. Mikolajczyk to the Delegate of the Polish Government in Poland with reference to the British Proposal… p 154

33)Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999

34)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Dispatch from Mr. Churchill to Marshal Stalin informing him of pressure put on the Polish Government… p 162

35) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Marshal Stalin's reply to Churchill's dispatch of February 1 p164

36) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Two resolutions of the Polish Government rejecting Soviet demands regarding Polish Frontiers and changes… p 176

37) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Note on the conversations between M. Mikolajczyk and Mr. McLaren… p 200

38)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Dispatch from Mr. Churchill to Marshal Stalin emphasizing… p 212

39)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Marshal Stalin's reply to Mr. Churchill's Dispatch of March 21…p 213

40)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on the impossibility… p241

41)General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Order of the Commander of the Home army to the Districts of the latter… p 284

42) General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945 Dispatch from General Soskkowski to General Bor… p 277

43) Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin, Glantz, David M, Orenstein Harold S, Belorussia 1944 The Soviet General Staff Study. Rokossovsky, K.K. A Soldier's Duty, Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader

Works Cited

Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999

Fleming, D.F. The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960. New York. Doubleday & Company 1961

General Sikorozki Historical Institute. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume I 1939-1943, London. Heinemann.1961

- - -Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Volume II 1943-1945, London. Heinemann.1967

Glantz, David M, Orenstein Harold S, Belorussia 1944 The Soviet General Staff Study. Portland: Frank Cass Press 2001

Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York: Da Capo Press,1996

Istoria Velikoi Otechstvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union]. Vol. 4. Moscow. Institut Marksizqma-Leninizma. 1960

Rokossovsky, K.K. A Soldier's Duty. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1980

"Text of German-Polish agreement of January 26, 1934". Brittish War Blue Book. < http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-028.html#1>

Werth, Alexander. Russia At War 1941-1945.New York: Avon Press, 1964

Zawodny, J.K. Nothing but Honour, The story of the Warsaw Uprising, 1944. Stanford, Hoover Institution press. 1978 Chiechanowski, Jan M. The Warsaw Uprising. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.




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