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Text by 1JMA member Skorzeny
Significant aspects of Soviet-Japanese
rivalry in the late 1930s remain in shadow like the massive Soviet military
aid to the Quomingtang government in China during the Sino-Japanese war,
although it was precisely the Soviet involvement which strenghened Chinese
defence capabilities significantly. Diplomatic relations between Quomintang
government and the USSR were resumed on December 12, 1932, opening way
for further cooperation after years of hostility and confrontation. After
the non-agression pact between China and USSR was signed on the 21st of
August 1937, a rapid intensification of the military cooperation followed,
boosted by the unprecedented aid package of 250 mln USD spearheading the
Soviet involvement into the raging war. The first negotiations of the
high-ranked military experts of both sides took place in Moscow on September
9, 1937—October 4, 1937, where the Soviet side agreed to begin the
immediate supply of the Chinese airforce with desperately needed hardware,
namely with 225 fighter planes. It was rather unusual for contemporary
international practice to begin deliveries before actual agreements on
the military aid loan were signed: thus the first agreement on the initial
aid packege of 50 mln USD was signed on March 1, 1938, and by that time
282 Soviet aircraft were delivered to the Chinese. As a matter of fact,
by late 1937 only some 20 Chinese planes remained serviceable, compared
with 500 available at the beginning of the year. This fact underlines
the importance of Soviet engagement for the military planning of both
sides.
In early 1930s the Chinese armed forces were aided by a group of German
military experts, led by Generals Berger, Seekt and Falkenhausen, which
until 1937 worked under individual contracts, and in May 1937 was officially
recognized as a foreign Wehrmacht military mission of 70 representatives.
However, following the development of cooperation between Germany and
Japan the activities of German military mission in China faced a stalemate,
especially after Germany recognized the Japanese puppet-state Manchoukuo
in May 1938. In May 1938 the German mission was recalled under pretext
of the arrival of Soviet military advisers. In early 1938 the group of
Soviet military experts, officers and advisers replaced the German mission
of General Falkenhausen aiding the Chinese High Command, all in all 300
experts and 5000 technical aides arriving on the rotation basis within
1937-1938 time span, including pilots, tankers, weapons experts, technicians,
medical workers, staff officers. Among the most prominent names one finds
future marshals of the Soviet Union, like P.S.Rybalko, K.P.Kazakov, V.I.Chuikov,
P.F. Zhygariev and several future generals, among them the notorious A.Vlasov.
The post of Chief Military Adviser at the Chinese High Command was given
to Soviet General M.Dratvin, who in November 1937—August 1938 was
also the Soviet military attache. Subsequently, the Chief Military Advisers
were: general A.Cherepanov (August 1938—August 1939), General K.Kachanov
(September 1939—February 1941), and General V.Chuikov (February
1941—February 1942). Throughout 1938—1940 the Soviet military
attaches were General N.Ivanov and P.Rybalko, and in 1940—1942 the
post was held by General V.Chuikov.
Moreover, massive amounts of military hardware have been shipped by sea
via French Indochina, Burma and Chinese ports and by air via Alma-Ata(capital
of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic), including 985 aircraft, 82 tanks
(T-26 type), 1317 artillery pieces, 1550 trucks, 30 tractors, 14,025 machine-guns,
164,5 mln rifle cartidges, 1,9 mln artillery shells and 82300 bombs. However,
some additional 265 aircraft were delivered prior to 1941, as well as
other hardware. The supplies of hardware from the Soviet Union were vital
for maintaining the fighting capabilities of all branches of Chinese armed
forces, namely mechanized units and airforce. In August 1938 the arrival
of 82 Soviet T-26 tanks enabled the formation of 1st Mechanized Division,
in fact led by the Soviet adviser, Major Chesnokov. Later division was
transformed into the 5th Mechanized army, reinforced by the Soviet-made
BA-type armoured cars, and participating in combat since October 1938
under the guidance of Soviet Major P.Belov. Soviet instructors played
an important role in improving the practical skills of the Chinese artillery
officers and trained the Chinese infantry officer-cadets, and, moreover,
participated in combat, mainly in armoured and artillery units.
Among the airplanes shipped to China with the Soviet crews in 1937 were
the formidably maneuverable I-15 and I-16 fighter planes, high-speed bombers
of the SB type, heavy TB-3 bombers and long-range DB-3 bomber planes,
which allowed the Soviet command to counter massive Japanese air attacks
with superb equipment and manpower, with the pilots having fought for
several years in Spain and possessing combat experience the Japanese could
hardly boast. In 1937—1940 the Soviet side delivered 563 fighter
planes (I-15, I-15bis, I-16 and I-153) and 322 bomber planes (292 SB bombers,
24 DB-3 bombers and 6 heavy TB-3 bombers).
The Chief Soviet Airforce Military Advisers were: Colonels G.Thor, P.Rychagov
and F.Polynin, all prominent airmen, especially P.Rychagov, who managed
to make a very impressive, if only short-lived, career after returning
from China. The first group of Soviet airmen arrived to Alma-Ata on October
21, 1937, en-route to China, consisting of 447 servicemen (pilots, techicians,
engineers, mechanics, radio-operators, meteorologists, airbase service
experts, decoders, military doctors, drivers, constructions specialists,
etc.). By early February 1939 there were 712 Soviet airmen serving in
China, nominally on voluntary basis. The flight to China from Alma-Ata
was a formidable challenge since the route covered the desert and mountainous
regions of the Northwestern China, and the improvised airfields situated
along the route were unfit for heavy bombers of the SB type, lacked communication
facilites and the meteorological services for the briefing of pilots.
The Soviet aircraft were usually carrying excess number of servicemen,
and the reserve quantities of fuel and ammunition. Once they arrived,
the overloaded aircraft lacked the necessary repair facilities, technical
service and command-and-control infrastructure. Chinese airfields lacked
even the most necessary technical facilities: the DB-3 bombers, for instance,
which needed 1500 litres of fuel, were filled up by 200-300 local peasants
lined in a file, carrying metal cans of gasoline. Climate conditions also
presented a challenge: during heavy rains the airfields, lacking elementary
drainage facilities, were rapidly turning into swamps, and during snowstorms
in the mountainous regions the snowdrifts prevented normal landing. The
existing Chinese airbases with concrete air-strips, hangares, protected
fuel-reservoirs and good repair workshops were generally well-known to
the Japanese, and were heavily bombed throughout the war. On the other
hand, the available labour resources enabled to erect effective defense
bulwarks made of bags filled with sand and gravel, quite useful during
Japanese air-raids targetting the airfields. The first group of Soviet
fighter and bomber pilots included F.Dobysh, I.Kozlov, V.Kurdiumov, M.Machin
and G.Prokofiev, who saw action on December 1, 1937, when 20 Japanese
aircraft were overtaken by 7 Soviet I-16 planes over Nanking. After flying
five combat sorties the Soviet airmen managed to shoot down, according
to their reckoning, 2 Japanese bombers and one I-96 fighter. Soon afterwards
a group of 9 Soviet SB bombers succesfully bombed Shanghai, attacking
Japanese airfield and the vessels stationed in local harbour, claiming
about a dozen of destroyed aircraft, 6 damaged ships and one auxilary
cruiser sunk. In November 1937 the second group of 150 Soviet airmen flying
SB bombers arrived from Transbaikal Military District, pioneering the
new route Irkutsk—Lanchou—Hankou across the Mongolian steppes.
In December 1937—February 1938 a Soviet fighter squadron of I-15
fighters (commander A.Blagoveshchensky) arrived in 3 groups. During the
aerial engagement over Uchan on February 18, 1938 the Soviet fighters
claimed 18 victories, mostly Japanese bombers, and on May 31 they shot
down 14 enemy aircraft. The effectiveness of Soviet aerial support was
proved by the official Japanese request to withdraw the pilots fighting
for Chinese airforce, aired in April 1938, rejected by the USSR under
pretext that the pilots serving in China were merely volunteers.
Typical Soviet combat missions included
support of the ground troops, bomber raids against Japanese airfields,
important railway stations, highways and shipping. The most ferocious
fighting took place in the context of the so-called Uchan defensive operation
in July—October 1938. Shortly before, a new squadron of SB bombers
(66 pilots) arrived from USSR, led by Colonel G.Thor, who previously participated
in the Spanish Civil war. The squadron specialized in disrupting the Japanese
navigation on the Yangtze river, vital for the supply of the Japanese
ground troops, claiming 16 Japanese transport vessels damaged and 92 sunk
(including a hydroplane carrier). As a result, the Japanese were forced
to establish serious anti-aircraft defence measures: deploying AA batteries
at the piers, arming the transport vessels with machine-guns and building
several new airfields along the Yangtze river. In July 1938 the large-scale
aerial battle over Uchan took place, where 40 Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters
led by Captain E.Nikolaenko confronted 200 Japanese aircraft.
By the year of 1939, the Soviet airforce based in China has scored a number
of impressive victories over the battlefield, and yet the numerically
superior Japanese aircraft were able to deliver crushing airstrikes both
against virtually undefended large Chinese cities and military installations,
possessing a developed network of airfields and superior reconaissaince
the Soviets desperately lacked, it was therefore decided to carry out
a surprise air-raid over the Japanese territory to boost the morale of
Chinese troops, inflict damage to the pride and self-confidence of Japanese
airmen and to test the capabilities of the AA defence the Japan possessed
at the moment. After the reconnaissance mission carried out on the 21st
of February 1939, a group of the 28 Soviet SB bombers led by excellent
bomber pilot F.P.Polynin attacked the Japanese air base near Taipei (Taiwan,
also known as Formosa) on the 23rd of February, destroying up to 40 Japanese
aircraft on the ground and demolishing the extensive fuel dumps, losing
not a single bomber in the raid, with Japanese AA defence of the base
left in ruins.
On the following day the smaller group
of the Soviet aircraft returned to attack secondary targets, meeting sporadic
resistance of Japanese fighter planes and AA artillery, which, however,
did not prevent the Soviets from bombing Japanese islands on the 20th
of May 1939, dropping bombs and safely returing to the Chinese mainland.
In October and November 1939 Chungking became the scene of intensive aerial
battles, where hundreds of aircraft were involved from both sides.
All in all, about 200 Soviet pilots
were killed in China in 1937—1939, including Lieutenant A.Gubenko,
who on May 31, 1938 committed the conscious ramming attack against Japanese
A5M2 fighter, first in the Soviet airforce and second in the world history
of aerial power. Of these 200 airmen 111 were killed in air-crashes caused
by difficult weather conditions, weak navigation support and inexperience
of younger pilots in the little-known theater. About 80 Japanese aircraft
were shot down in aerial combat by the Soviet pilots, 14 of whom were
awarded “Hero of the Soviet Union” order for outstanding performance
either as combat pilots, military advisers and instructors, 400 servicemen
were decorated with different awards. In Janury 1940 the majority of Soviet
pilots left China, having trained a generation of Chinese airmen and providing
them the remaining hardware, and the remaining personnel was evacuated
in early 1942.
Literature:
1. Y.Chudodeev “Defending Chinese Skies”// “On the Eve”,
ed. by N.Yakovlev, O.Stepanova, E.Salynskaja, Moscow, 1991, pp.118--127.
2. “On the Chinese soil”, Moscow: “Nauka”, 1977.
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